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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This study will investigate the foundations cf Ma-rtin -
Buber's authenticity. 1l1he problem of the foundations of 
authenticity arises in Jean-Paul Sartre who makes contra-
dictory claims when he says on the one hand there are no 
objective ethical values while on the other says "we ought 
to be authentic". The questions are 1 , Can authenticity be 
separated from objective values and still impose an obliga-
tion? And what are the foundations for saying "we ought 
to be authentic"? 
In the first section Buber's notion of Wirklich keit · 
(actuality) is examined and will be shown. to provide some 
legitimate foundation for authenticity oy implying an 
obliga.tion in reference to what man "ought to be". 
The second section reviews Buber's acceptance of 
objective values and discusses hew this acceptance provides 
Buber with another foundation of authenticity. Buber's 
notion of Verant wortung (responsibility) is essential to 
i 
understanding his views on objective ethical values and 
their ontological foundation in God. 
The third section poi~ts cut how Buber's philosophy 
overcomes the ex isten t i al :nothingness th at ccnfronts modern 
man. 
In the Conclusion the value and importance of Buber's 
philosophy, as well as so me of the problems connected with 
it, are discussed. 
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.The Pr ·o blem and the Plan 
It seems odd that in a study on authenticity in the 
philosophy of Martin Buber I begin with Sartre, for no two 
thinkers could be further apart. But the1"e are valuable 
insights to be gained concerning authenticity in general 
by a short, critical account of Sartrean authenticity. 
Furthermore, Sartre's extrerr1e, atheistic existentialism 
makes fer some interesting contrasts with Buber's religious 
existentialism and throughout the study I will be making 
these contrasts evident. 
The problsm of the foundation of authenticity surfaces 
in Sartre. H.is existentialism is confounding. One wonders 
how he can, on the one hand, deny objective values, while 
on the other exhort us to be authentic. He seems to speak 
from two sides of his mouth, Alfred Stern remarks, 
It is strange that a philosopher, who 
denies in this way all bases for value 
judgments that are objectively valid, 
would utter so ~requently the most 
offensive value judgments, with ·che 
most apodictic certainty, on the moral 
behavior of other people, and cla .im 
1 
2 
1 universaJ. vali di ty fol'· such "philo-
' sophical cate go:r.-ies11 a.s "co ward" .and 
1,,...a,,.. ,·1d" 1 ;::, ..l..,::l.\. • 
The questions that come to mind are: Is there an obligation 
to be authentic? and why _ ought I become auth~ntic? These 
questions point to the axiological basis of authenticity 
and the answer to them invc,lves Sartre in some difficulties. 
Sartre has tried to steer clear of .. obligation". 
Fredrick Olafson, in his book Principles and Perso~s, 
traces the philosophic history of ethical voluntarism and 
is concerned with the problem of authenticity and obliga-
tion. He points out: 
It is not difficult to locate the sources 
of the antipathy whi ch the concept of 
obligation typically invokes in existen-
tialist philosophers. The root notion in 
that concept is one of being bound in the 
sense of being subject to an effective 
restriction on the permissible range of 
human choice. Traditionally, this restric-
tion itself has been thought of as indepen-
dent of and unremo-vable by, human volition. 
Indeed, many moralists have argued that it 
1ID!tl be independent of choice i f we are to 
be able to talk--as we all do--of what
2
we 
ought to do even when we do not do it. 
Sartrean aut he ntici t y has its seeds in freedom and 
1Alfred Stern, Sartre~ (New Yerka Delta Books, 1967), 
p. 41. 
2Fredrick Ola . .fs on , crj: nciples fi,nd P,ersons, (Baltimore, 
Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 192. 
3 
negation4 : Willia.In Barrett sa.ys 01Ths essential freedom, the 
ultimate and final :freedom that cannot be taken from a man, 
is to say No. This is the basic premise in Sartre's view 
of human freedoms freedom .is in its very essence negative, 
though this negativ.ity is also creative,. 11 3 Objective values 
and a human essence are denied because they interfere with 
man's freedom. Sartre says No to objective values because 
they impose an obligation, "what I ought to do", He says 
No to an essence because it too implies an obligation: 
"what I ought to be", and because an essence implies a 
creator or designer. Man is hence the maker of his own 
values, the inventor of his own essence. He must recog-
nize his complete freedom and complete responsibility. 4 
But while Sartre revolts against the traditional sources 
0 
of obligation he seems to want to say that one ought to be 
authentic, that one shouldn't be a coward or filthy 
stinker. 
Hazel E. Barnes, in her An Existentialist EthjQ§i 
3William Barratt, rxrational Man, (Garden City, New 
Yorks Anchor Books, 1962), p. 241. 
4cr. Sartre 3 s discussion cf "existence precedes 
essence", Jean-Paul Sartre 8 "The Humanism of Existential-
ism", in t:s~ in ~xj,sten tj_alism, \'lade Baskin editor. 
(New Yorkz 'l'ha Citadel Press, 1970), pp. J4-40. 
4 
attempts to bridge the gap ·between Sartrean authenticity 
and obligation. She cla ims th at in recognizing one is 
freedom one also sees the responsibility involved and an 
obligation. "As process, not entity, tr.an is free and 
responsible . Sin, guilt, or evil involves denying this 
fact, either in oneself or in another person." 5 Barnes 
finds this concept of obligation to be compatible with 
Sartre's denial of objective value-I do not. 
A deeper look at the foundation of Sartre's authen-
ticity shows that Sartre has tacitly, and in contradiction 
to his denial of objective values, reintroduced them. If 
pressed, it seems that Sartre and Barnes would reply that 
authenticity is grounded in honestly facing and accepting 
what they take to be man's situation. Man really is free 
and respor..siblel 6 Attempts to deny this are dishonest and 
in bad faith (mauvaise foi). Sartre distinguishes two 
types of bad faith: 7 first, presenting to oneself as true 
5Hazel E~ Barnes, An ~xistentialist Ethics, (New Yorki 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 94. 
6cr. Jean-Paul Sartre. Being and Nothingness, Hazel 
E. Barnes translator, (Ne\v York~ The Ci tad el Press, 1956), 
pp • .529-532. 
/ 
·7cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, !!Bad Faith", in ~ssays in Exis-
tentialism, pp. 147-186. 
5 
a pleasing tmtruth and seco nd ! presen t i:ig to on-aself as 
untrue a displeasing tr ut h., Both a:ce flights from authentic 
existence, and ·note, both are flights from truthfulness. 
For Sartre. the key to authentic existence rests in 
honestly accepting all the anguish and responsibility that 
travel with freedom. Inauthenticity or bad faith is a lie. 
NFundamentally it is a lie about one's freedom. Bad faith 
is a way of declaring that one is not responsible for what 
he has been or not free to choose what he will be. It 
seeks refuge in the idea that man may either cut himself 
off completely from his si ttmtion or that he ll identical 
with his situation and determi,ned by it. Good faith, as 
the existentialist sees its lies in accepting the truth 
about man's being." 8 To put it succintly, the foundation 
of Sartrean authenticity lies in the imperative that we 
ought to be honest. More specifically, we ought to be 
honest about our freedom and responsibility. This is an 
imperative that effects all men and upon which authentic 
and inauthentic existence turns. 
To be sure, Sartre and Barnes would deny this 
8Barnes, An Existentislis..1 Ethics~ p. 84. 
6 
intern::ceta.tion but unles s there .1s a. unive -rsa1 .. imperative . ' 
I 
then there is no foundatio n f or saying we ought to be 
autherrtic. 
A nun1ber of commentators •ha~e made. similar observations · · 
on the unfoundedness of Sartre's authenticity and responsi-
b'ility. Jean .Wahl says, "From Nietzsche ·to Sartre, such 
is the road of modern philosophy. In one as in the other, 
values are posited without having any foundation." 9 
Olafson summarizes a powerful argument against Sartre like 
this, 
If morality were, at bottom, a matter of 
will and choice as the existentialists 
believe, then all obligations would be 
self-imposed. An obli gation I have created, 
however, is one from which I can release 
myself; and the latter. so the argument 
goes, is no obligation at a11.10 
Paul Roubiczek gives a devastating critique of Sartrean 
responsibility in his bock ~xistentialisma For and Aeainst: 
Nevertheless, these existentialists {who 
deny objective values) want to preserve 
responsibility, to show that man is 
responsible for what he is and what he 
does. In this they failo Man, according 
------------
9 Jean Wahl, "Martin Buber a.nd the Philosophers of 
Existence," in Th f9 Ph ilo so pn,_y pf Mar t in Buter, Maurice 
Friedman and Paul Schlipp editors, (LaSalle, Illinoiss 
Open ·ccurt Publis hing Compan y , 196? ) f p . 500 . 
10 P 1 ·R · ·, · - k "' · ..... ,.., · · , , · F d 1 • t au . OiJ.DJ..CZ •~ , ,~X],_S3,et ,tl.~J. • .fillH or fill gains , 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres s, 1966}, pp. 88-89~ 
7 
to the m, i s res pon sible f or his actions 
to himsel f , but a s t he re is no given 
moral i t y, he can con s ta nt l y chan ge the 
princip le s on which he bases his actions. 
Though mos t existent ialists deny it, this 
leads once more t o.wards a conce pt of the 
absolutef f er, t o make sP.nse, responsi-
bility demands dependence on a transcen-
dental whic h is absolute. 'l'o make se nse, 
responsibili t y has to be, not only 're-
·sponsibili t y for · but also 'responsibility 
to', and man himself is insufficient to 
give meani ng t o the latter, unless he 
admits t he presence of transcendental 
elements i n his own nature. Morality can-
not be arbitrarily created; it must have 
authority,11 
The upshot of this is clear. The Sartrean theory of 
authenticity and responsibility presents a problem: either 
Sartre has contradicted himself by reintroducing the 
objective value (honesty) that gives his authenticity 
obligation, or his authenticity is groundless and there is 
no reason to be authentic and no axiological difference 
between authenticity and inauthenticity • .Authenticity 
must be grounded in objective values and it is the implica-
tions of this and the relationship between authenticity, 
values and essence that will be examined in the rest of 
this study, This will be done by analyzing Martin Buber's 
concept of authenticity, specifically his concepts of 
11Paul Roubiczek, Exis t entialis m: For and Against, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 88- 89w 
8 
~4/irklichkei t -(Actuality) _ an~-- Ver 2.·nt.wortan g (Responsibility). 
1fhe plan of the study i~ to ha ve three s.actions examining 
the following questions: I. Wirkli~~keit; What is the 
1 t . b t d th t. . .... ? -1 re a 1.on e ween essence an au en 1c1..,y., .L. Verant-
wortung; What is the relation between objective values and 
authenticity?, III. ' The Overcoming of Nothingness--The 
· Life ·· of Dialogue; How ca.n modern ·man overcome the separation 
and alienation facing his life? 
I. WIRKLICHKEIT 
Unwirklich bleibt, wer nicht verwirklicht. 1 
. 2 
Alles wirklicke Leben ist Begegung. 
Buber seldom uses the words authenticity or authentic. 
The key terms that have led commentators like Maurice 
Friedman to speak about authenticity are Wirkliqhkei:t. er 
one of its derivatives, for example wirklich. Wirklichkeit 
is one of the most important notions in Buber's thoughtand 
this is on.e of the reasons I leave it untranslated. Another 
reason to leave it in German is that the two translators of 
I and Thoq render it differently. Walter K2.ufman trans-
lates Wirklichkeit as uactuality" and Ronald Gregor Smith 
as "reality". But perhaps the best reason to leave the 
term in its original language is one that both translaiors 
wquld agree on, Some of the associations due to the rich-
ness of the German Wirklichkeit are lost by rendering it 
1Martin Buber, Daniel in Werke: 
?Chri -ften Zur Philosonhie, (Munich: 
1962), p. 24. 
~rster Band 
Lambert Schneider, 
2Yiartin Buber, Ich und Du, Ibid., p. 85 
9 
; : . -,.-
10 
either "actuality" or real ity' '. Per example .,, there is the 
-.. Kaufman's use of "ac -t-uality " has its · merits over Smith's · 
"reality" • . Kaufman says, n;suber's .persistentassociation 
of Wi·,-klichkei't, with wirken can -be carried over into English 
to some extent by us i ng "actuality" for the former (saving 
"reality" for the rare instances when he· uses Realita.t) ·and 
"act" in a variety of ways for the verb. 113 
What I hope to do in the rest of this section is: 
first, to clarify Buber's use of Wirklichkeit; second to . 
show its connection to his distinction between person and 
ego and to reciprocity (gegenseitigkeit), . that is, - to the -
influence that the different ways of relating to being have 
on the I; and finally point to how Wirklichkeit provides a 
foundation for authenticity by implying that I ought to 
exist in a certain way. 
The concept of Wirklichkeit has its roots in Buber's 
claim in I and Thou that "The I of the basic word I-Thou is 
different f rom that in the basic word I-It. Basic words ••• 
3walter Kaufman. Preface in Martin Buber, I and Thou, 
Walter ¥..aufma.n translator, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
19?0), pp. 45-46. Cf. also p. 61, footnote 4. 
l 1 ..... 
establish rnod.es of existe nce • .,,4 r,~in' s twofold I is one of 
the most important points of I and rr·hou, but also one of 
·the most difficult to explain. Perhaps the best way to · 
do so is to focus on the last - sentence of the above quote: 
"Basic words establish modes of existence." The basic 
words are how one addresses being in one of its three · 
realmsi nature, other men and God. In the I-Thou one 
meets the other for the "other's sake 11 • In the I-It one 
appropriates the other for the 0 I's sake". The I-Thou 
asks nothing of the other, he says Thou. "No purpose in-
tervenes between I and Thou, no greed and no anticipation ••• 
Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have 
disintegrated encounters occur. -1115 The I of the I-It asks 
"what's in it for !rut"; "what can I get"; ttI experience"; 
".I have". The modes of existence that the I-Thou and I-It 
establish refer to the existence of the I, and the modes 
are ~i~kli~ (actual) for the I of the I-Thou and unwirklich 
(inactual) for the I of' the I-It. Buber- says, 
4Buber~ I and Thou, pp. 53-54 -. Throughout this study 
I have used Y.aufman es trari.slation ·out changed his rendering 
of Ich-Du as I-You back to the traditional I-Thou. 
5Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
· 1 .. , 
J.L. 
Whoever s t ands in {the I - Thou) relation, 
p~~tic i pates in a c~ua lity; •• • wher e t here 
is no pa rti cipation t h~~e i s n o act uality ~ 
Where t he r e is sel f-a ppro p~ iation ~ there i s 
. no · act ual ity . Th9 more d ir ect l y th e Thou. 
is - touc hed~ th e ~oie pe r f ect the partici-
pation. t 
The main point is t hi s: a man's relationships reveal and 
determine the qualit y of his life. "The real self appears 
only wher. it enters into (the I.,.Thou) relation with t he 
other .. Where this relation is rejected, the real self 
,., 
withers away." r Wirklichkeit is a qualitative notion, that 
is. it refers to the qualit y of man's life. 
It is important to re member that Buber stresses the 
fftorturously dual" 8 character of man's relationships and of 
his I. Man is an entangled series of the actual and in-
actual I. The I-It in itself is not evil, in fact, the 
It-world is necessary for human survival. The danger comes 
when I-It is man's dominant approach to being. "In all 
seriousness cf truth listens without It a human being can-
not live~ B~t whoever lives only with It is not human. 09 
6Ibid., p. 11J. 
7Martin Buber, The Ecli n9__g_ of God, (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1957), p, JO. 
8Buber, I gnd Thou , p. 69. 
9Ibid., p. 85. 
1 -:, 
~ . ..) 
Buber helps to clari f y Wirkl?~~ hke:i.t and its connection 
to man.' s. -.:wofold I by dis tinguishing oetween a person and 
an The person re presents the actual 
I of the :I-'fhou while the eg o represents the inactual I of 
the I-Ite 
There are not t wo kinds of human beings, 
but there are two poles of humanity, No 
human bein g is pure person, a.nd none is 
pure ego; none is entirel y actual, none 
entirely lacking in actuality. Each lives 
in a twofold. I. But ·some men are so 
person-02:·iented that one may call them 
persons, while others are so ego-oriented 
that one may call them egos. The more a 
human being, the more humanity is dominated 
by the ego, the
1
pore does the I fall prey 
to inactuali ty o • 
In 1957, 1:an.y years after the above was written, Buber made 
further comments en this distinction in a taped conversation 
with the p sychologist Carl Rogers. He said, 
A person, I would say, is an individual 
living really with the world. With the 
world, I don't mean in the world ·--j ust 
in real £.onte-,ct, in real reciprocity with 
the world in all the points in which the 
world can meet mane12 
Characteristic of the person is engagement. Characteristic 
10Kauf :nan translates Eigenweseu with "ego" while Smith 
uses "indi -,riduality". In a footnote to I an<!_ Thou, (p. 111, 
footnote 7 ) Kaufman comments on Buber's dislike of the Smith 
version ~ 
11Buber, I and Thou, pp. 114-115. 
12Martin Buber, "Dialo gue be-cween Martin Buber and Carl 
Rogers" i n The _!\.now.led ~@ o:( Man, Maurice Friedman Edi tor, 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 184. 
~ •,•• 
l.4 
of the .ego is detz ichriient ~· · · T.he person ' engages in order to 
meet. The ego detaches in tJ:rder to , e;t:pe::ience and use. 
The ego does not pa rticipate in actuality, 
nor does he g~.in a:1y. He sets hi:ns ·elf apart 
from everyt hing else and tries to possess as 
much as pos sibl e by means of experience and 
use. That is his dynamics: setting himself 
apart and taking ?uss 7s~i?n--ari.d the ·~b~ect is always It, tha.1: whicn is no"t actuaJ.. 3 
So in Buber's philosophy person and ego are terms that 
have a precisely defined meaning. The former is given to 
the man whose life is centered around the I-Thou relation 
and who is wirklich (actual). The latter refers to the 
man whose life revolves around the I-It relation and who 
is unwirklich {unactual) .. 
How much of a person a man is depends 
on how strong the I of . the basic word 
I-Thou is in the human duality of his I. 
The way he says I--what he means when he 
says I--decides where a man belongs -and 
where he goes. The word "I" is the true 
shibboleth of humanity. (That is the 
password that distinguishes one group of 
men from another.) Listen to itl 
1
Uow 
dissonant the I of the ego sou.~dsl 
Let us now e.xamine Buber• s notion of reciprocity and 
its connection to Wirklichkeit. 
Buber claims that "Relation is reciprocity". 15 What 
tJBuber, l and Thou, Pc 114·. 
14 Ibiq_., p. 115. 
t5Ibid., pp. 58 and 67~ 
.1.5 
he means by this ist how: rt:'ilate to others affects my 
I, that is, if I relate to another in the I-Thou, I am 
wirklich (actual) while if I relate in the I-It 1 I am 
unwirklich { inactual). 'rhis statement of Buber's has 
often been misunderstood. Some have taken it to mean that 
the other partner of relation also must respond in the 
I-Thou manner. However, this is an erroneous interpreta-
tion since Buber claims that it is possible to have an 
I-Thou relation with a tree, 16 which obviously cannot 
respond in the I-Thou m~nner. Malcolm Diamond helps to 
clarify this by saying: 
Since the term I-Thou so strongly suggests 
the personal, critics often seem to believe 
that Buber imagines tha.t the tree is aware 
of him in the same sense that he is aware 
of it. They do so, however, iy the face of 
his denial of any such notion. 7 
But another problem arises. Many take Buber's saying 
that "Relation is reciprocity" to mean that, at least in 
interhuman relationships, an I-Thou relation cccurs only 
when both partners relate to each other in the I-Thou. 
16cr. Buber's beautiful description of the tree and the 
ways of relating to it. Ibid., pp. 57-59. 
17M.3.lcolm Diamond. MartJ • ..11 l3.JJ.ber: .:'ewish ~xistentialist, 
(New Yorks Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. JO. 
This toQ is a mistaken interpretation . "Mutua~speech · 
and answer are not the essential . cr ·iteria , of .the I-Thou . 
·re 1·at J •• --on· ·• " 18 T. · · · · · ' · · l · · ·· · · · · ' ' o be sure, tne 1.a.ea · s1 tua tion 1.s wnen · 
both parties relate, in the I-Thou, but it is not necessary. 
·I think ·this error can be tracetl to Sm1th's -transla:.. 
tion of . I and. Thou. lie translates two Gerl!'""tn words 
(Gegenseitigkeit and ~utuc:lU,ta:t) by one English word 
(mutuality). 19 This leads to confusions because Buber 
means two different things -by the two different words -. 
Gegenseitigkeit, which Kaufman tra.~slates as reciprocity, 
refers as stated above, to the fact that when I say Thou 
my I becomes actual. Geg§.p.seitigke.it can be predicated 
of all I-Thou relations. Mutualitat, which Kaufman renders 
mutuality, refers to the situation where both pa.rtners of 
a relation address the other as Thou. Mutuality is the 
ideal in human relationships, but cannot be predicated of 
all I-Thou relations. In the postscript added to I and 
18Grete Schaeder, The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Bube~, 
Noah J. Jacobs translator, {Detroit, Michigan: Wayne 
State University Press, 1973), p. 41+8. 
19on pages 82 and 88 of Ich gn~ Qg in Buber's Werke he 
wrote "Beziehung ist Gegenseitigkeit.11 Which Smith trans-
lat~s as "Relation is mutual", pages B»and 15. On page 
166 Buber wrote " ••• die volle l'!lutualitat nicht dem 
" Mi.teinanderleben der Menschen inhorict." which Smith trans-
la ,tes as O ••• full mutuality is not inherent in men's life 
together." p. 1J1, 
, ,.., 
J. { 
'rhou in 1957 Buber wrote: · 
Everything tells you that complete mu-
tuality does :10-c inhere in men's life 
with one ano t her. It is ·~ form of 
grace for which one must always be 
prepared but on which one can never 
count. Yet there are :also m-:--.ny I-Thou 
relationships that by their very nature .,.,0 may never unfold into complete mutuality.~ 
The last task of this section is to discuss the ! 
connection between Wirklichkeit and essence and to show 
in what way an essence can help provide a foundation for 
authenticity. 
Implicit in Buber's concept of Wirklichkeit is an 
essence, an essence that defines how man "ought to be." 
In order to avoid confusions it must be pointed out here 
that the term 'essence' does not have the same connotation 
as it does in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. In 
Aristotelian-Thomistic terminology the term essence refers 
to the "essential" deter .mination of a being as opposed to 
the accidental. For example, the human essence is some-
thing I, as a hu.~an being, cannot be other than I am. An 
essence in this traditional sense is precisely that which 
defines me as being human rather than something else. It 
20 Buber, I and Thou. p. 178. 
18 
is something I cannot alt er or change. · It .is the factual 
. nature that I am., and no t a 1r..at t~r of choj.ce . or achive•w 
trient. Essence in the Ar:i.stolelian-'rhomistic trac.ition is 
an ontological notion. -
Since one of Buber's primary concerns is the ethical · 
we can turn there . tc illustrate a dif:ferent use of the · 
term 'essence'. Analogous to the ontological sphere one 
can also speak of the "essential'' determination of an 
individual's character. Thus Buber can say that a man is 
essentially a person (or virtuous) or essentially an ego 
(or not virtuous)o Here we are speaking of the · essential 
determination of character and for Buber this essential 
determination of a man's character is the manner with which 
he relates to being. To put it succinctly, when Buber 
makes a statement like a man ought to actualize his essence 
he means that a man ought to become virtuous. For Buber, 
. man's essence, or real self is a possibility that is 
~ 
actualized in the I-Thou relation. Really existing as a 
person, in Buber's technical meaning of the word, is not 
simply a birthright. 
i 
1 Since Buber sees man's essence as an axiological 
rather than an ontological prir:ciple., it is an achievement, 
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a possibility to whic h man i s ca lled and therefo r e 
reconcilable wit h man~s fr eed om. Ma.n's essence, in th e 
axiological sen s e, ~akes a claim, it imposes an obligat i on 
onman--"he ought to exist .a certain way", that is achieve 
his a13sence. In contrast, it wou ld be meaningless or 
absurd to say "one ought to be one's essence" if the term 
essence is used the ontological or Aristotelian-Thomistic 
sense since one cannot help being what he is by nature. 
Essence, in Buber's sense is reconcilable wi_th freedo m 
because it makes an inescapable claim, but one that man i s 
not forced .to answer. Man may be inauthentic if he so 
chooses. But because man is free to decide t o be authentic 
or inauthentic, to answer or not answer the call to be a 
person in Buber's sense of the word, does no·t mean there 
is no obligation, only that the obligation can be shirked. 
One of the reasons Sartre denies God is that he thinks 
if God exists then man has a blueprint he must follow and 
is not free. For Buber, God's design of man is "what we 
ought to be", but there is no necessity compelling us. God, 
indeed, has designed man for a certain goal but ~n chooses 
whether t o meet the demands of becomi ng what he ought to 
become. The existe nce of God provides Buber with the final 
20 
source of w.an' s axiol: ,g:ical ess en ce and his authenticity ·. 
God is the sanctioning power behind ine . obligation of -
•. . . . 
striving for the goal of authenticity. Ultimately man 
is accountable :to and responsible to God for his character, 




In the Introduction I intimated that for authenticity 
to be meaningful it must be based on obligation. In the 
preceding section Buber's notion of Wirklichkei~ was 
discussed and shown to provide some foundation for authen-
ticity by implying what man ought to become. In this 
section Buber's acceptance of the objectivity of ethical 
values will be discussed in connection with h:is notion of 
Verantwortung (responsibility). 
There are two main points: first, Buber's emphasis on 
the independence and absoluteness of ethical values which 
is reflected in his notion of Verantwortung (responsibility), 
and second, Buber's analysis of Sartre's denial of objec-
tive ethical values~ 
Buber has argued throughout his writings that ethical 
values must be independent, that is, the value of an act 
cannot ultimately rest on the will of men nor on the act's 
mere usefulness to men. He says, 
We mean by the ethical ••• the yes and no 
which man gives to the conduct and 




distinction bet wee:h ther.:i ·which affirms 
or denies t hem z1ot ac::.co rding to the i r 
usefulness or harmfulness fo r ind i v id uals 
and .society, but according to their in-
trinsic value . and disvalue .1 . 
Buber claims that values are intrinsic properties of real 
things, not merely projections of individ -ua·ls or s0ciet1es. 
Further, he holds that values can have the _ authority 
necessary to impose an obligation only if they are inde-
pendent and absolute. 
One can believe _ in and accept a meaning . 
or a value ••• if one has discovered it, 
not if one has invented it. lt can 
become for me an illuminating meeting, 
a direction giving value, orily if it . 
has been revealed to me in my meeting 
with being, not if I have freely chosen 
it for myself among other existin g possi-
bilities and perhaps have in addition 
decided with a few fellow creatures: 
This shall be valid from now on. 2 
To say that values must be discovered rather than invented 
implies the independence of value. Discovery points to 
something overagainst me that I find out. It intimates a 
I 
relation that I enter into with the thing I discover. In 
discovery I unveil and recognize something that exists 





independently of me. This dis-:inc ti on between the dis-
c;o1rery and invention of value is one of the major dis-
agreements be tween Sartre and Buber. Buber holds that the 
origin of value is outside . of man whi l e Sartre, with his 
doctrine o:f the free creation of values, ho ld s that man is 
the origin of values. 
Defenders of the independent and non-relative character 
o:f ethical values are few in our time. "To deny the 
presence of . unive -rsal values and norms--that is the con-
spicuous -tendency of our age." 3 Recent theories of value 
are characterized by the reduction of value to some form 
of relativism. For example, A. J. Ayer sees values as . 
"imotive expressions" and R. B. Perry d~fin~s values as 
"objects of any interest". But it is really no wonder that 
much of contemporary philosophy denies the independence and 
absoluteness of value since man is seen as the originator 
of value. Our age denies God and the absolute in all of 
its forms and attempts to place in man's hands what has 
traditionally been placed in God's. Sartre, in hThe 
Humanism of Existentialism'#~uotes Dostoye~sky who said, 
3Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 108. 
4sartre, "The Humanism of Existentialism", in Essays in 
Existentialism, p. 41. 
24 
"If -Ood:didn't exist, ev er yt hing would be possible. 0 The 
death of God is also the death of objective ethical values 
which have their ontological foundation in him. When God 
died so d:ki the ultimate source of - obligation. It is 
important to note that · Dostoyevsky 8 s statement -is hypothet-
ical and Sartre seems to take it as a statement of fact. 
Buber would agree that ethics to be meaningful must be 
grounded in God, but the death of · God is not a statement 
about the existence of God but rather about our relation-
ship to a God that really exists. r-liarvin Fox gives a 
nice summary of the importance of God in Buber's ethics 
when he says, 
Buber believes that moral values must be 
absolute and must be related to an abso-
lute else they cannot be binding at all. 
When man is concerned to know what it is 
that he really ought to do there is no 
possible answer except in terms of an 
absolute demand ••• If a man wants to know 
what is right and what is wrong, if he 
seeks to discover the intrinsically valu-
able, then, Buber believes he must appeal . 
to the absolute. In this commitment to 
absolute values we see one side of Buber's 
moral philosophy, namely the conviction 
that the absolute (i.e. God) exists, that 
he is the source of values and of moral 
obligation, and that all men are account-
able to him.) 
I have quoted Fox at length because he stresses an important -
5Marvin Fox, "Some Problems in Buber's Moral Philosophy", 
in The Philosophy 9..f Martin Bub~, p. 153. 
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side of Buber Is ax i olo gy . Valu e .$ cannot be ab s olute . unless 
they a .re grounded in the a bsolute, Bi1ber says, "Only an 
absolute can give the quality of absoluteness to a.n obli-
gation."6 The obligation of objectiv ~ values places 
demands on all men, "Over and above all the countless 
and varied -peoples there is an authority, named or unnamed, 
to which communities as well as individuals must inwardly 
render an account of themselves, 117 Buber's philosophy 
firtds a place for objective values because he keaps their 
ontological foundation. He can uphold objective values 
because he believes man is ultimately responsible, whether 
he knows it or not, to a being superior to his own will 
and the decrees of society. 
I say •whether he knows it or not" because while Buber 
stresses the ontological dependence of values on God he 
also holds that one can recognize and acknowledge values 
without recognizing and acknowledging God's existence. 
Buber tried to clarify this in his "Replies to My Critics". 
6Buber, The Eclipse .Qf Go~. p, 18. 
. 71.'ft.artin Buber, ~rael and the World, (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1963), p. 220, 
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Fox accuse d Buber of making v a lu es epistemo l ogically 
depend en t on God, that is, in order to knaw values I must 
know God first. 8 B1,.tber responds• "Where do I teach that? 
If I taught that, I would, indeed, have to be of the 
opinion that a man who does not believe in God could not 
act morally. But I am by no means of that opinion." 9 
Buber's position could be put this way: In the order of 
being (ordo essendi) God is necessarily prior to values 
since they ontologically depend on him. But in the order 
of knowing (ordo cognoscendi) values gan be known prior to 
knowledge or belief in God. 
Buber's concept of Verantwortung (responsibility) 
reflects his emphasis on the independent and absolute 
character of ethical values. Once again it is the richness 
of the Ge~n that prompts me to leave the term untrans-
lated. The significance of responsibility in the ethical 
sense is brought out more clearly in the German than in 
the English. There is, as in English, an intimate connection 
between a.ntworten (to respond), Antwort (response), 
8Fox, "'S ome Problems in Buber's Moral Philosophy", 
in The Philosonhy of Martin Buber, p. 159. 
9Buber, "Replies to My Critics", Ibid., p. 700. 
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verantwortlich (r e s ponsib l e) , and Vera nt wortung (responsi-
bility) • . But t he .Engl i s h does not convey what the root of 
the German word does. Wort; is the word, call, · or claim 
that demands a response. Smith says, "If the reader will 
remember that 'responsibility' carries in itself the root 
sense of being 'answerable', then the significance of the 
'word' (Wort) in actual life will not be lost. 1110 The 
word (Wort) or claim of objective values demands a response 
(Antwort). 
For · Buber, w~n is responsible (verantwortlich) because 
• 
he has an obligation in the face of the claim ethical 
values · make. Responsibility for Buber means that man has 
the ability and duty to respond to being in an appropriate 
way, that is in a way that takes being seriously on its 
own account. Nathan Rotenstreich says that .. Buber stresses 
the phenomenon of responsibility in its two senses--the one 
sense is that of responding to a call and the other is that 
of being supposed to respond, that is to say, responsibility 
qua acco~ntability. 1111 
10Ronald Gregor Smith, Translator's Notes, in Between 
Man and Man, p. 206, note 2. 
11Rotenstreich, "The Right and Limitations of Buber's 
Dialogical Thought r•, in The Ph1losophy of Martin Buber, p. 99. 
2 5 
Bu1::er says -that "Genui ne r es pon r;ibility exist s only · 
h · 1. • 1 d' ,.12 w E:TL "t11ere .1.s r~a _ .re sp on .1.n g. . This means that one 
fu -lfills his responsibility when he "realiy responds II' 
that is, responds in the I-~hou manner. In the ethical 
realm responsibility means recognizing and complying t o 
the claim of objective ethical values. 
':rhe connection between Wirklichkeit and Verantwortung 
can now be brought out, Buber's philosophy claims that 
man's essence is actualized when man becomes aware of and 
responds appropriately to the importance of what is over-
against him. Objective ethical values represent one sphere 
of being overagainst man and part of authentic existe nce 
lies in the co mpliance t o objective ethical values. 
In contrast to Buber's emphasis en compliance Sar t re's 
view of man is based on the rejection of any relation that 
implies compliance or obedience. And as we would expect 
Buber's final analysis of Sartre is quite severe. He 
pointedly suggests that 11Sartre has started from the 'si-
lence' of God without asking himself what part our not 
hearing and our not having heard has played in that 
· silence." 13 -He :furt -her criticizes Sartre by saying~ · 
12Buber, Be t ween Man and Man, p, 16. 
13Buber, The Ec l ipse of po d, p, 69~ 
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Does exist ence r aal ly mean, as Sartre 
t ·hinks, existi ng " for cn esel f", encapsu-
lated in one I s own subjec ·t ivi ty? Or does 
it not essential ly mean sta nd in g over-
against t he :x.--not an x, but the x itself. 
"God," says Sartre, "is the quintessence 
of the Other." But the Other for Sartre 
is he who "loo ks at" me, who ~akes me into 
an object, as I make him ••• But what if God 
is not the quintessence of the Other, but 
rather its absoluteness? And wh~t if it 
is not primari ly the reciprocal relation 
of subject and ob je ct which exists between 
me and the other, but rather
4
the recipro-
cal relation of I and Thou?1 
Sartre, to be sure, has failed to see the importance of 
the I-Thou relation. In fact, he has failed to see the 
I-Thou at all. Sartre, because he sees man's relation to 
being only in terms of the subject-object relation has 
relegated all relationships to that of conflict, possession, 
and a threat to the individual's freedom. 
Sartre limits human relationships a I1.riori 
to my knowing the other as subject only 
when he knows me as object, or, at best, 
to my recognizing his freedom only as a 
freedom I wish to posses and dominate by 
my own freedom ••• Buber sees the I-Thou 
relation as the existential and ontologi-
cal reality in which the self comes into 
being and through which it fulfills and 
authenticates itself.15 
In Good and Evil Buber describes what he considers to be 
14Tb·d .:!:....1,_. • pp • 67-68 • 
15~.aurice Friedman, Introduction to Between Man and Man, 
pp. xvi-xvii. · 
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-the mcst radi.cal stage of evil and it sounds remarkably · 
.like a cri~ique of, , the . fa ~te that Sartre dooms his authen-
tic man to. "By glorify ing .and blessing h1mself as his 
own creator, he commits the lie against being, yea, he 
wants to raise it, the -lie; ·to Tule over •being; for truth 
shall no longer be what he experiences as such but what he 
. · · "16 ordains as such. . Sartre's radical freedom destroys all 
notion of value, but he wants us to .be honest and face our 
situation. He says, "We want a doctrine based on truth and 
not a lot of fine thecries." 17 Sartre has burned every 
bridge that leads . to an .,ought'' but still · seems · to say "we 
ought to be honest." Sartre's existentialism leads "where 
no primary address and claim can touch me, for everything 
is "my property"; responsibility has become a :phantom. 1118 
Throughout his philosophy Buber argues that obligations 
to be absolute must ultimately be rooted in God. In the 
. first section we noted how God was · seen ·as the source of . 
what man ought to be. In this section it was pointed out 
16Buber, Good and ~vil, Translated by Ronald Gregor 
Smith, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 138. 
17sartre, "The Humanism of Existentialism"t in Essays 
in Existentialism, p. 50. 
18Buber, Between Man anq Man, p. 45. 
that Buber sees God as the ontol og:tca l basis of objective 
ethical values. His reason is that «Responsibility pre-
supposes one who addresses me primarily, that is from a 
realm independent of myself, and to whom I . am answerable. 
He addresses me about something that he has entrusted to 
me and that I am bound to take care of loyally. 1119 
19Ibid 
. --· 
III~ THE OVERCOMING OF NOTHINGNESS 
We have seen Zarathustra 
bone weary 
atop his mountain 
wondering, 
pondering 
if he has really overcome 
his nihilism--





pursued by the Fury-Flies 
after reaching his 
nothingness? 
Wasn't it the Knight of Faith 
who leapt past--
across the abyss 






In keepi11 g wi t h t ~1e exi st entialis t tradition, Buber 
too, graphically speaks of nothingness or t he abyss facing 
modern man. In this section I hope to show what · the · 
pro 'blem of nothingness is in Euber• s philosophy and how 
his "life of dialogueu attempts to resolve this problem. 
To say that nothingness is a proble.m to be . resolved 
hints that Buber has another disagreement with Sartre. 
Nothingness for Buber is not, as it is for Sartre, the 
ontological foundation of man's existence. 1 Nothingness 
in Buber is a metaphorical description of the tragic 
condition of modern man. It is a metaphor of man's 
separation (Versonderung) and alienation (V~rfremdung) 2 
from nature, other men and God. Sartre's ontological use 
of nothingness implies that it is to be sought because it 
is where authenticity lies. Nothingness for Sartre is 
man's misery and his greatness. It is his misery because 
it involves life's absurdity, w.an • s complete loneliness, 
and man's alienation from others and even himself, and 
1cr. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Chapter One and 
Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics , p. 79 "From this nothing-
ness stems man's freedom. 11 
2 , 
Buber, I and Thou, p. 107s 
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his greatness because by being noth i ng man is absolutely 
., 
free.~ Bu-ber, , .. ,to .. the _ contrary, s$es nothingness _as a con-
dition that can .and -ought to .be overcome. That nothingness 
in its various forms can and should be overcome is a 
position that Buber, Nietzsche 4 and Kierkegaard agree en. -
'\ 
Nothingness is found in Nietzsche's "On the Three 
. Metamorphoses 11 • 5 With stirring images : he tells of the 
advancement of nihilism and its eventual overcoming. The 
first stage is the camel--the beast of burden who bears the 
herci's values that are thrust on its back. In the second 
stage the camel becomes . a lion who revolts - and fights the 
dragon "Thou Shalt'' with the roarous NO of nihilism. But 
3sartre uses nothingness in both -the ontological and 
metaphorical senses. Ontological nothingness provides the 
basis for man's absolute freedom. Metaphorical nothingness 
~efers to man's anxiety about being absolutely free, i.e., 
his anxiety about his total responsibility for himself. 
4In saying that Nietzsche saw nihilism as something 
to be overcome I am taking a stand in something of a contro-
versy. Arthur Danto in Nietzsche as Philosopher, (New York: 
MacMillan Company, 1970), p. JJ, argues that Nietzsche is 
a "complete nihilist". Richard Schacht in "Nietzsche and 
Nihilism", Nietzsche: !_ Collection of Critical EssaY§., 
Robert Solomon editor, (Garden City, New York, 197J), 
pp. 58-82, sees Nietzsche's nihilism as a transitional 
stage of his philosophy. 
5Friedrich Nietzsche, 1hus Spoke Zarathustra in The 
Portable Nietzsc he, Walter Kaufman translator and editor, 
{New York: The Viking Press, 1968), pp. 137-140. 
ni hilism is overc ome when th e lion trans f orms into the 
•yes-saying" chil d . Kierk ega ard, i n t he §.,ickness Unto 
·Death 6 describe s the abyss of despair t hat confronts all 
men and is overcome by believing in and loving God. But 
there is a significant difference between nothingness in 
Buber and nothingne ss in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche and Kierkeg aard see their respective for ms of 
nothingness (nihilism and despair) as necessary steps to 
" their respective goals (the Ubermensch and the faith in 
and love of God); Buber sees nothingness as that which 
takes away from and prohibits real living (Wirklichkeit). 
Nothingness in any form is not the path that leads nor the 
emptiness that drives man to authentic existence. 
In light of his philosophy of dialogue we can expect 
Buber to analyze man's separation and alienation in terms 
of the rift between modern man and his relations to nature, 
other men, and God. We can also expect to find Buber's 
resolution of the problem of nothingness to lie in man's 
entering into appropriate relationships in these three 
spheres. According to Buber it · is in the realm of the 
6soren Kierkegaard, The ;3ick ness Unt o Death, Walter 
Lowrie translator, (Princeton, New Jerseys Princeton 
University Press, 1954), pp. 155 and 194. 
"Between' ' that the proi::le m of no thi ngness arises and so 
it is there .it must 'oe reme died . Rotenstreich says, 
He sees the remedy of the human predica-
ment impl ie d i n the sickne ss of our time 
in the fulfillment of the relationship 
between I and Thou .. Because of the 
strees laid on the remedy of the sickness 
· of time• he reaches a point where · o·ntol-
ogy is a matter of fact replaced by 
imperatives. 7 . · · · 
The Experience of Nothingness 
In his novel Daniel Buber artistically describes the · 
chaos facing modern man. Reinhold tells Daniel about his 
experience of nothingness; "I no longer know any calm. 
Rather restlessness and wandering and the worst anxiety--
these have become by cornrades." 8 Reinhold feels separate 
and out of place in the world, a world he used to know as 
"my sister". 9 Reinhold relates how one evening attracted 
, by the ocean's stillness and beauty, and beckoned by a new 
moon, he went out in a small boat. As quickly as a summer 
storm arises the sea's splendor changed and became a stormy 
7Rotenstreich, "The Right and the Limitations of 
Buber's Dialogical Thought" in The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber, P• 1.)2. 
8Buber, Daniel, p. 82 • 
.9Ibid~, p. 84. 
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gulf that fe nce d Reinho ld ~f r: c:,. 3:·~ore . This separation 
became an i :.age of the a byss ln Rei nhold• s li fe. "The 
abyss was be t ween piece an d piece of t he wor l d, between 
thing and thing, between image and being, between the world 
and me • .,to After finally rea.ching the shore this feeling 
of separation and estrangement did not leave. 
There my las t security shattered; broken I 
set foot on t he shore, and when I s et foot 
on the shor e , · i t was to me a discordant, 
disjointed l i fe. Behind me the storm rose 
over the sea, before me lay the calm land; 
but it was to me as though I now left the 
last, fearful hiding place of calm and 
entered into the harsh storm that would 
never end. 
Since then the abyss is before me at all 
times, 11 
Reinhold's experience depicts a situation that Buber 
describes as .. homelessness" and which he has analyzed at 
length throughout his works. Buber says, 
In the history of the human spirit I 
distinguish between epochs of habitation 
and epochs of homelessness. In the former 
man lives in the world as in a house, as 
in a home. In the latter, man lives in the 
w~rld as in an open field and at times does 
not even h12e four pegs with which to set up a tent. 
tOibid,., p. 84. 
11Ibid., pp. 86-87,. 
12Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 126. 
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He further divides homelessness into social and cosmic 
.. _.homelessnes.s. . .Soci?-1 .l':l.omelessness _ refers .to man's sep<:1.ra-
. . . 
tion and alienation . from other men, cosmic homelessness to 
man's feelings of being "marooned in the universe, 1113 and 
being :forgotten by or completely cut-of'f from God. 
Social Homelessness 
Wian's separation and alienation from his fellow men 
has its roots in an over-development of the I-It relation, 
of man's preoccupation with use and experience. The char-
acterization of our age is the progressive increase of man's 
ability to use and experience and a decrease in his powers 
to relate. 14 In looking at Buber's concept of Wirklichkeit 
we saw that authenticity lies in the I-Thou relationship 
and that "when man lets It have its way, the relentless 
growing It-world grows over him like weeds, his own I loses 
actuality. 1115 Man indeed · is twofold and the I-It is neces-
sary for survival, but for modern man, the It-world ha~ 
13schaeder, The Hebrew Humanism of Martih Buber, p. 29. 
14 -
Buber, I and Jhou, cf. pp. 87 and 89. 
l.5Ibid., P• 96 • 
39 
become canc erou s, infec ti r<~: 100.n ;,;i th inauthenticity and 
silently gnawing at the actual I. Perhaps Buber's main 
message is th.at this separation and alienation from others 
. . 
is accompanied by a separation and alienation of self. 
The abyss between man and man causes, but also reflects the 
abyss within man himself. Robert Wood says, "The threat of 
nothingness stands over the I who dwells exclusively in the 
world of it." 16 Man, in turning from others, turns from 
himself. "The problematic situation of modern man _or the 
sickness of time, as Buber puts it, is an indication of a 
melancholic .development inherent in the fact of our aliena-
tion from the basic and normative human situati.on." 17 
Modern man has let his life-giving potentiality to relate 
be usurped by his powers to use, to experience~ to profit, 
to produce, to possess, to have. Our "alienation from the 
basic and normative human situation" is an alienation from 
ourselves, from the actual I of the I-Thou. While man has 
increased his ways and means of "having" he has lost touch 
16Robert Wood, Martin Buber's Onto~, (Evanston, 
Indiana, Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 71. 
17~athan Rotenstreich, "The Right and Limitations of 
Buber's Dialogical Thought", in The Philosophy of Martj.n 
Buber, p. 122 . 
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with how to authentical l y i' be". Our age is sick and nin 
sick ages it happens that t he . rt-world, no longer irri-
gated and fertilized by the living currents of the Thou- · 
world, severed and stagnant, becomes a gigantic swamp 
phantom and overpowers man.H18 
In I and Thou and Between Man and Nian Buber has analyzed 
at length two extremes of modern mans individualism and 
collectivism. In the modern situation nwe have the massive 
and chaotic swinging of the penduium from individualism to 
collectivism, from one extreme of inauthentic hurna.n1 ty to 
another. 1119 Buber rejects individualism and collectivism 
because ·they are views of man that make the I-Thou relation 
impossible. In individualism there is no Thou, only Ie In 
collectivism there is no I, only We or Us. One cannot 
tolerate the Thou, the other cannot tolerate the I. 
Individualism understands only a part 
of man, collectivism understands man 
only as a part: neither advances to 
the wholeness of man, to man as a whole. 
Individualism see •s man only in relation 
to himself, but collectivism does not 
see man at all, it sees only society. 
With the former man's face is distorted, 
with the latter it is maslced. 20 
18Buber, I and. Thou, p. 102. 
19wood, Martin Buber's Ontolo~ " p. 77. 
20Buber, Bet ween Man~ Man, p. 200. 
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Collect i v·ism has long ·:),0 n abhor red by existentialists. 
' 
Seei ng man only as a cog in ~ome machine is what much of 
existentialism is a reaction to. Nietzsche detests the 
herd. Kierkegaard's crowd induces a false security that 
prohibits believing. In Sartre's Argos the people are 
inauthentic pawns of Zeus and Aegisthus. Buber too rejects 
collectivism. 
Here the human being tries to escape 
his destin y of solitude by becoming 
completely embedded in one of the 
massive modern group formations. The 
more massive, unbroken and powerful in 
i+.s achieve men ts this is, the more the 
man is able to feel that he is saved , 
from both forms of hom~Iessness, the 
social and the cosmic. 
Collectivism promises man the s~curity which he craves, but 
in reality it only hides his loneliness and separation. It 
is not the remedy of homelessness. Gabriel Marcel comments, 
It is true that the human personality 
first attempts to escape its isolation 
by adding itself to the mass. Yet 
therein lies an illusion that reflection 
suffices to dis pel . In the midst of a 
collectivity, man is not with man or 
alongside man. The isolation is not 
surmounted, it is smothered as a sound 
may be drowned out by noise.22 · 
But while collectivism is recognized by most existentialists 
21 Ibid., p. 201. 
· 22Gabriel Marcel, "I and Thou" in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber. p. 42 . 
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as inauthen t ic, many over - re act -by dooming man to -an 
egoi~ti~ . individt!alism. Th is is the p~th of' Sartre. 
Authenticity for Buber, as it should be clear by now, lies 
in relating to the other. In Sartre it consists of 
opposing · the · other. 2..3. ·-· Buber makes some pointed ·criticisms · . 
of Sartre's individualism. 
It 1s Sartre who has raised - to a principle 
of existence the deficiency of a person 
who is shut up in himself. Sartre regards 
the walls between the partners in a con-
versation as simply impassable. For him 
it is inevitable human destiny that a man 
has directly to do only with himself and 
his own affairs • . The inner existence of 
the other is his own concern, not mine; 
there is no direct relation with the 
other, nor can there be.24 
It is ironic that Buber criticizes Sartre, the upholder of 
freedom, for dooming man to fatalism. nThis is perhaps the 
clearest expression of the wretched fatalism of modern man, 
which regards degeneration as the unch~ngeable nature of 
Homo Saniens and the misfortune of having run into a blind 
alley as his primal fate, and which brands every thought of 
a breakthrough as reactionary romanticism. 1125 Individualism 
is not where authenticity lies--"to ·save himself from the 
23cf. Sartre's No Exit and "The Look" in Being and 
fiothingnesg. 
24Buber, The Knowledge .Q.f Man. p. 79. 
25Ibid. 
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despair ,,-:i th which his scli-tary state threatens him, man 
d • f 1 . "" • • t .,26 resorts to the expe ient o g_oriry1ng i. 
Authenticity and the overcoming of nothingness rest 
in the .,Between 11 not in the e:J.Ctremes of individualism and 
collectivism. The I-Thou relation is the third possibility 
that smashes the false alternatives of individualism and 
collectivism that face modern man, and overcomes - social 
homelessness. The man who lives only in the It-world 
gradually falls away from being truly man. He may dwell 
in an individualism alienated from others er in a collec-
tivism of mutually alienated individuals bound only by their 
alienation and needs. Only if man returns to meeting will 
he overcome the abyss and come to authenticity. 11 By virtue 
of it (the I-Thou relation) we are not abandoned to the 
alienation of the world and the deactualization of the I. 1127 
Cosmic Homelessness 
Social homelessness is the covering over of the actual 
26Buber, Between Man and M~,n, p. 200. 
??Buber, I and Tho~, p. 149. 
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"I" caused by the ove r d~v!'.•d opment; o'.t t he I-It relation in 
the _spher~ of t he i nt er human. Cosmic homelessne ss has its 
roots in man's mis-relation to and di sconnection from .the 
Absolute. Man's connection tothe Absolute is twofold: 
first in .his relationship to God, the Eternal Thou, and 
second in his recognition of and compliance to the absolute 
claim that objective values make. In the rest of this 
section I want to discuss how Buber links man's feelings 
of nothingness to the disintegration of hisrelations to 
both God and objecti ve values. 
In I and Thou Buber claims that ."from the former (the 
I-Thou relation) a path leads to God, fromine latter (the 
I-It relation) only to nothingness. 1128 In Buber's thought, 
the I-Thou relation is bound to God in several ways. First, 
Buber defines God as the Eternal Thou. That is, as the one 
who never relates to being in any way but the I-Thou manner. 
The main point can be put this way: God is characterized 
\. 
as being essentially onefold in his relations and this is 
in contrast to man's twofold ways of relating. God is only 
an actual ,.,I" and addresses being solely as "Thou". · Man 
28 Ibid., P• 75. ~f 1 150 v • a sop. • 
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fluctuatas between actual:. '..Y and inactuali t�r, and addresses 
being as "Thou" and 0 It". Perhaps the greatest demonstra­
tion of mar1's twofoldness is his relation to God. Man 
ta.kes the Eternal Thou anci relates to him as an It. "The 
Eternal Thou is Thou by its very nature; only our nature 
forces us to draw him into the It-world and It-speech.029
Man has many ways of reducing God to an It. We can see 
God as only something we are to profit by, For example, 
gaining eternal happiness or forgiveness. We can "study" 
God and speak about him rather than speak to him. In his 
"Autobiographical Fragments" Buber tells of an incident 
with a friend that occurred in 1914. His friend asked, 
"Do you believe in God?•• and Buber answered a quick "Yes." 
But the quastion stayed with him long after his friend had 
left him. Later that same day Buber thought, "If to believe 
in God means to be able to talk about him in the third 
person, then I do not believe in God, If to believe in him 
means to be able to talk to him, then I believe in God."JO 
Buber made a similar point when he said, "It is not 
29Ibid., p. 148.
30Martin Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments", in The
Philosophy of Martin Buber, p. 24. 
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necessary to know s omet hi ng cl.bout God in order ·to really 
belleve in_ him 1 _ _ many true , believers kn.ow how _to talk to 
God but not about hi~."3 1 
The second way I-Thou r _elations are bound to God can 
be seen in Buber's claim that, "Extended; the lines of 
relation •intersect in the Eternal Thou. Every single Thou 
is a glimpse of that. Through every single Thou the basic 
word addresses the Eternal Thou. 1132 This is at best a 
doctrine that is difficult to prove and one that had 
troubled Buber's translator and commentator Ronald Gregor 
Smith. Smith wrote, 
This point (that every Thou is connected to 
the Eternal Thou) is undoubtedly the crux of 
Buber's view. It is in the last analysis a 
matter of faith. I recall that I once asked 
him a question about this. I said something 
to the effect that it was not clear to me 
how the Eternal Thou was to be understood as 
implicated in each relational event. How 
could this be proved? 'Proved?' he replied. 
'You know that it is sol' Now, long after-
ward, I understand that this knowing of 
which he spoke was a trustful, believing 
knowing. And trust of this kind must be 
affirmed, it may even be confirmed as bear-
ing ultimate meanine:; but it cannot be 
demonstratect.33 - · 
31Buber, The Eclipse of God, p. 28. 
32Buber, 1 and Thou, p. 123. 
-33Ronald _Gregor Smith, Martin Buber, (Richmond, 
Virginia• John Knox Press, 1967;, pp • . 21-22e 
,-
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I have neit her t he ti me no} desire in this study to get 
invobred in t his problematic claim of Buber's. What is 
important and relevant to this study is the significance of 
this claim since it points to an important thread that runs 
throughout Buber's thought. Much of Buber's philosophy is 
an attempt to make the spiritual livable. Walter Kaufman 
says that the point of 1. ar1d Thou "was partly to break 
down the division between the everyday world and religiono 
'l4 Eventually God is found in the everyday world, in the !2,y.".., 
Buber's point in saying that every I-Thou gives a glimpse 
of the Eternal Thou is that the religious and the secular 
are intimately related. A man's relationship to God is 
linked to his relationship to other men and to the world. 
"Above and below are bound to one another. The word of 
him who wishes to speak with men without speaking to God is 
not fulfilled; but the word of him who wishes to speak with 
God without speaking with men goes astray." 35 In I and 
Thou Buber expresses a similar view when he says, "He who 
knows the world as something by which he can profit, knows 
34 . 
Walter Kaufman, "Buber's Religious Significance", The 
~pilosophy of Martin Buber, p. 682. 
35 Buber, Between Man m1S! Man, p, 15. 
God in the same way.n3 6 
For Buber the way to God i s to be found in the Hasidic 
notion of the "hallowing of the everyday " . Hasidism was 
the nineteenth century east European Jewish mysticism that 
Buber studied and was greatly influenced by. Maurice 
Friedman traces the etymological roots of "Hasidism". He 
says, "The Hebre ,¥ word hasjq means 'pious•. It is derived 
from the noun hesed meaning loving kindness. 037 Hasidism 
attempted to synthesize the spiritual and the secular by 
making man's everyday living his synagogue. "Hasidism's 
· message, according to Buber, resides above all in its · rela-
tion to concrete reality ••• The essential message of Hasidism 
can be summed up in a sir..gle sentence, God can be seen in 
. 38 
everything and reached by every pure deed." Man meets 
God by approaching his fellow men and the world with "loving 
kindness 11 • 
Cosmic homelessness is man turning his back on God, 
either directly by relating to God as an It or not relating 
36Buber, I and Thou, p, 107. 
37.Maurice Friedman, Martin Bgb)rs The Life of Dialogue, 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960, p.lb.--
38schaeder, The Hebrew Humanism QI.. Martin Buber, p. 292. 
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to him at all, or indirect :r t y :~ tti ng the I-It relation 
dominate his life with othe rs and the worlde Buber char-
acterizes man•s turning away from God as the 11Eclipse of 
God". 
In our age the I-It relation, gigantically 
swollen, has usurped, practically uncontested, 
the mastery and the rule. The I of this 
relation, an I that possesses all, makes all, 
succeeds with all, this I that is unable to 
say Thou, unable to meet being essentially, 
is the lord of the hour. This selfhood that 
has become o:nnipotent, with all the It around 
it, can naturally acknowledge neither God nor 
any genuine absolute (such as objective 
values) which manifests itself to man as of 
non-human origin. It steps in between and 
shuts off from us the light of heaven.39 
Just as an eclipse of the sun is '1 something that occurs 
between our eyes and the sun and not a change in the sun 
itself" 4o so in our relationship to God it is not God who 
changes and hides himself but something that has stepped 
between God and us. The overwhelming development of the 
I-It is the obstacle that hides God fro:n our eyes. Modern 
man's possessive and solipsistic attitudes have made him 
blind to the absolute. But "its ligtt seems darkened only 
because the eye suffers from a cataract"" 41 
39Buber, The Ecliu~e of Go~, p. 129. 
4oibid., P• 23. 
41Buber, Betwean Man and Man, p. 117. 
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Anothe r- source of n:an ; s GOSrni c homelessness is man's · 
deafness t -o t he _ directio n gi-vin g c laims of objective values. 
"°iften enough ·we think the.re is nothing to hear, but long 
before we have ourselves put wax in our ears." 42 Modern 
man's cosmic homelessness is exhibited in his feelings of 
directionlessness. He seemingly has no foundation whatso-
ever for his actions. 
That man has no basis for action but his own will is 
the view of Sartre. 43 Sartre's philosophy emphasizes man's 
nothingness as the ontological basis of his being. Sartre 
arrives at ' man's nothingness via the category of possibility, 
which he sees as an important basis of man's radical freedom. 
But while for Sartre possioility is the source of man's 
freedom, for Buber it is one of the sources of man's cosmic 
homelessness. Because man is free he is always confronted 
with possibilities he can choose between. Even in the face 
of objective values man, because he is free, has the possi-
·" 
bility of accepting or rejecting what he "ought to do". 
42 Buber, I and Thou, p. 137. 
43cr. Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Humanism of Existentialism" 
is Essays in Existentialism, pp. 41-48 where he discusses 
the forlornness and anguish that accompany man's freedom. 
-
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For :Buber possi.bili ty oec;o mes th e gateway to nothing-
ness when man faces ethical choices in the darkness of the 
-eclipse of objective values. Possibility, without the 
direction of objective values, swallows man in its nothing-
ness. 
The human person inevitably becomes aware 
of the category of possibility which of 
all living creatures is represented just 
in man ••• The evolving human person I am 
speaking of is bowled over by possibility 
as an infinitude. The plentitude of pos-
sibility floods over his small reality and 
overwhelms it.44 
The category of possibility~ separated from objective 
values, dooms man to nothingness and an overglorification 
of freedom, which is a failure to submit to what is over 
and above the individual. It is the freedom that is no 
longer concerned with truth, but soiely with the I. By 
approaching being in the I-Thou man meets and discovers 
meaning and values. "With the change of heart there is a 
change of eye, and to his new view there is meaning in what 
was for long meaningless. 045 
Cosmic homelessness, like social homelessness is 
44 
1 Buber, Good filJ,g_ Evil, p. 125. 
I 
45Ibid.., p • .5, 
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cyercome by a ,,.eturn t o t he l ife of dialogue. When man 
addresses being as Thou he recognizes t he absolute in its · 
forms of God and objective values. "I can know neither 
God nor moral values as transcendent rr.•ali ties knowable in 
themselves apart from the dialogue in which I meet God and 
d . 1 .. 46 1.scover va. ues. 
The overcoming cf nothingness by the life of dialogue 
further reflects Buber's attempt to join the religious and 
the secular. When social hom~l~ssn~ss is overcome by the 
life of dialogue man is no longer doomed to the alienation 
and conflict that Sartre depicts in No Exit. When cosmic 
homelessness is overcome by the life of dialogue man is no 
longer a directionless and unfounded being in a world that 
is de trop. 
Buber sees the inner connection between 
what he calls cosmic and social homeless-
ness. He seems to think that the over-
coming through dialogue of the social 
homelessness, that is to say, of what is 
the nearest homelessness to the concrete 
human being, leads, ll.§.Q facto, to the 
overcoming of the cosmic homelessness or 
vice versa, the overcoming of the cosmic 
homelessness in the dialogical situation 
between man and God leads to the overcoming 
46Maurice Friedman, Introduction to Between Man and Man, 
p. xviii. 
1- , .;i ...,.., 
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ical si tuatir m betw een man and man. !? 
·Perhap's Buber's point eould be put this wayi When :man 
recognizes the val ue of being in any of its spheres he 
opens the door to seeing more. Seeing things in light of · 
only what "I can get" makes one blind to the importance of 
the other. Homelessness in its two forms is due to man•s 
preoccupation with only himself, and the danger is that 
this preoccupation can become so addictive that the life 
of dialogue disappears. 
Buber's main message is for man to step out of the 
solipsistic, all pervasive gg,Q and become a person who 
meets being and thus discovers the meaning that has been 
eclipsed. 
YOU YOURSELF MUS'f BEGIN. EXISTENCE WILL 
REMAIN MEANINGLESS FOR YOU IF YOU YOURSELF 
DO NOT PENETRATE INTO IT WITH ACTIVE LOVE 
AND IF YOU DO NOT IN THIS WAY DISCOVER ITS 
MEANING FOR YOURSELF. EVERYTHING IS WAIT-
ING TO BE HALLOWED BY YOU, IT IS WAITING TO 
BE DISCLOSED IN ITS MEANING AND TO BE 
REALIZED IN IT BY YOU. FOR THE SAKE OF THIS 
YOUR BEGINNING, GOD CREATED THE WORLD. HE 
HAS DRAWN IT OUT OF HIIVJ.SELF SO THAT YOU MAY 
BRING IT CLOSER TO HIM. MEET THE WORLD WITH 
THE FULNESS OF YOUR BEING AND YOU SHALL MEET 
HIM ••• IF YOU WISH TO BELIEVE, LOVEt48 
47Rotenstreich, "The Right and Limitations of Buber's 
Dialogical Thought", in The Philosophy of Maill.n Buber, 
p. 121. 
48Buber, On Judaism, p. 202. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some Problems 
A pri mary philosophical problem in Buber's thought is 
his unfounded metaphysical claims. Buber holds that God 
and objective ethical values exist and that these values 
ontologically depend on God without giving philosophical 
justifications for these metaphysical principles. Buber i.s 
prone to making oracular statements about these matters 
rather than giving philosophical proofs. 
Buber does defend his not offering philosophical jus-
tifications for God's existence. He holds that such justi-
fications are at best ineffective. Buber's distinction 
between talking about God and talking to God points in this 
direction. Buber, like Pascal and Kierkegaard, stresses 
man's direct -relationship to God rather than rational 
justifications for his existence. All three want the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jaeob rather than the God of the philoso-
phers. They believe a man becomes convinced that God exists 
by personally meeting and communicating with him, not by 
philosophical arguments. Even if one is rationally 
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convinced G_od ex i st ed ~:.'=' h:.ts ye-c t o bec ome rel i gious. 
Talking about God, as r a tion al theology has traditionally 
done, does not change one's life. But talking to God in 
direct relation does. 
Buber is persona l ly convinced that God and objective 
ethical values exist. Indeed much of his philosophy can be 
seen as a polemic aga in st those who deny God and objective 
ethical values. Buber attempts to explain wby other men 
are blind and deaf to the God and the objective ethical 
values he so clear l y sees and hears in his own life. For 
Buber the very nature of God and objective ethical values is 
such that they must be met and known personally. Demonstra-
tion is insufficient, Man's inability to see God and hear 
the claim of objective ethical values is not a result of 
either's non-existence, but a result of the blinding and 
deafening growth of the I-It attitude~ Buber does not prove 
the existence of God and objective ethical values. Nor does 
he attempt to. They are, from the view of the objective 
method, his philosophical presuppositions. But from the 
view of the subjective method they are entities Buber has 
really encountered in his life. What Buber does is offer 
an alternative explanation abo
1
ut why God and objective 
• 
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e th ica l values have be·-~:01:is e cli p-E<~ii to the vision of some 
men, Buber describ e s the purpose of his ph i losophy when 
he saysz 
I only point to something. I point to 
reality, I only point t o so ~~thin g in 
reality that had not or had t oo little 
been seen, I take him who listens to me 
by the hand and lead him to the window . 
I op:n t~e window and .point to what is 
outside, . . 
The view that the existence of God. and objective ethi-
cal values is not subject to demonstration, but rather knovm 
by a personal seein g or encountering, is a reasonable 
position and one that Buber tries to defend. But his claim 
that ethical values ontologically depend on God cries out 
for justification. One immediately wonders why and wants 
an explanation. The closest Buber comes to giving such 
justification lies in his analysis of Verantwortung. He 
says that "responsibility only exists when the court is there 
to which I am responsible. 112 Since Buber connects responsi-
bility to someone calling for a response, or someone I ~m. 
responsible to, he grounds values in God who is the court to 
1Buber, .,Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, p. 693. 
2Buber, Between Man and Man, Po 17. 
which one is res ponsib le. The l ogi c of the argument seems 
to be -this, If there are ab solute imperatives (values) 
then there must be first, someone making the demands of the 
imperatives and second, the demander himself must be above 
individual men and societies in order to bestow the quality 
of absoluteness on the demands; since there are absolute 
imperatives they are founded in a demander who is absolute. 
There are a number of problems here. First, it may be 
grammatically true that imperatives imply a demander, but 
this is a far cry from a philosophical justification that 
shows absolute values rest in God. That imperatives imply 
a demander could say more about our language than about meta-
physics. Second, Buber does not make it at all clear what 
the connection between the absolute being and the absolute-
ness of ethical values is. Once again it is an obvious 
grammatical fact tha~ the term absoluteness is derived from 
the term absolute but this is no metaphysical justification 
for the ontological derivation of the absoluteness of values 
from the absolute, that is, God. It may indeed be the ·case 
that God is the ontological foundation of ethical values. 
All I am saying here is that Buber does not show this to be 
the case. He only says it and thus is open to criticism. 
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Bu.ber•s acceptar!c e of God a-::, t he ontolo g ical found.a-
tion of ·value . rn~y have: b~en prompted tq some degree_ by the 
influence that Nietzsche had on him in his youth. 3 In his 
attack on the traditional v~ew of good and evil - Nietzsche 
stressed that since God had died there was no longer any 
basis for objective ethical values. In The Q§Y Science 
.Nietzsche says: 
The greatest recent event--that "God is . 
dead, t, that the belief in the Christian 
God has ceased to be believable--is even 
now beginning to cast its first shadows 
over Europe ••• In the main, however, this 
may be said: the event itself is much 
too great, too distant, too far from the 
comprehension of the many even for the 
tidings of it to be thought of as having 
arrived yet, not to speak of the notion 
that many people might know what has 
really happened here, and what must col-
lapse now that this belief has been under-
mined--all that was built upon it, leaned 
on it, grew into i.t; for
4
example, our -
whole European morality. 
In his philosophy Buber naively accepts that God is the 
foundation of value and argues against Nietzsche's and 
Sartre's position that there is no God and hence no objec-
tive values. 
3cr. Schaeder, The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Buber, 
PP• 13, 31 and 385. 
4Friedrich Nietzsche, . The Gay Science, in The Portable 
Nietzsche, ·rranslated and Edi t .ed by Walter Kaufman, ( New 
York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 447. 
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Another importan t weak:-~ess in Buber's thought is 
his unclearness about t he self. In the firs~ section on 
Wirklichkeit I tried t o clarify Buber's implied use cf the 
term essence by distinguishing between the ontological and 
axiological uses of the term. When Buber says that man 
must achieve his essence what he means is that man is re-
sponsible for his ethical character or axiological self or 
essence. Buber's concern with the ethical has lead him to 
his doctrine of man actualizing himself in the I-Thou 
relation and his emphasis on the axiological self, But this 
concern overshadows and leaves unclear the status of the 
ontological essence or self in his philosophy. The ontolog-
ical self becomes even more problematic when one finds 
statements likes "There is no I as such but only the I of 
the basic word I-Thou and the I of the basic word I-It."5 
Buber seems here to be saying that there is only the axiolog-
ical self--that there is no such entity as the ontological 
self. If Buber does mean this he has insurmountable diffi-
culties, insurmountable because implied in his philosophy 
of relation is the ontological self. The I-Thou is a 
5Buber, I ~nd Thou, p. 54, 
:.::o 
relation and for there t o be a rela ti on there ~ust be 
entit : es _that are ~related. The I, in the ontolog~~~l sense, 
is not a result of relatio n as is the I in the axiological 
sense, The ontological I is the necessary presupposition 
.. 
of relation~ · The axiolo g~cal self is a qaalitative notion 
and as such requires the ontological self just as qualities 
require substances, Ithihk Buber, despite the above 
quote, realizes the necessity of the ontological self, He 
says, "The I is indispensable for any relationship~" 6 His 
weakness is that he does not properly distinguish the onto-
logical from the axiological self even though he intimates 
.the difference, Buber himself s~ems confus~d about how he 
uses the terms I and self and the result of this confusion 
is often contradictory statements like: There is no self 
apart from relation on the one hand and relation presupposes 
the self on the other. The distinction between the ontologi-
cal and axiological self remedies this contradiction since 
the former can be rendered there is no axiological self 
apart from relation and the latter can be rendered relation 
presupposes the ontological sel~. Clarifying the distinction 
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between the onto.logical and axiological self pr ovides s. 
ke~ .. to unl ocki ng th e mystery to rnany puzzling statements 
of Buber's. For example, when Buber says "man becomes I 
through a 'l'hou, 117 he is referring to the axiological I that 
is actualized in the I -Thou. When he says, "whoever lives 
only with that (the I-It relation) is not human, 118 he is 
referring again to the axiological human essence which is 
achieved, not the ontological human essence which a human 
being cannot lose or gain since it is what he is. Buber's 
accentuation of the category of relation has left unclear 
the role and importance of the category of substance. 
Buber's Significance 
The significance of Buber's philosophy lies in its 
rehabilitative character, Not only has Buber not succumbed 
to the Zeitgeist that has relativized ethical values and 
made man "the measure of all things", but he has actively 
tried to correct modern man's crippling preoccupation with 
only himself and his ovm purposes, 
The key to understanding Buber, and in fact his main 
?Ibid,, p. 80. 
8Ibid., p. 85, 
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contribution to philos ophy l ies in his distinction between 
I-Thou and I-It relati ins. I ·t sh0u ld _be _cl~a~ _by _now that 
in the I-Thou relation the I realizes that what is over-
against him should be taken seriously on its· own account 
and he is not merely concerned with using and/or dominating 
the other as is the I of the I-It relation. But Buber~s 
terminol6gy is somewhat misleading. In calling the basic 
attitude that takes being seriously on its own account I-
Thou Buber leads us to believe that what is overagainst us 
which is to be taken seriously is of a personal nature, To 
be sure, man's relationships to persons, both other men and 
a personal God~- i.s an important and even the highest dimen-
sion of the I-Thou relation, but Thou in Buber's philosophy 
is not restricted to personal beings, The interpersonal is 
the highest dimension of the I-Thou because it is where the 
ideal of reciprocal I-Thou relating can take place. With 
other men and God Thou can be addressed by as well as to the 
I. But one can also address nonpersonal beings as Thou as 
Buber explains with his example of an I-Thou relation to a 
tree. This is exactly the problem with Buber's terminology ': . 
it seems odd to say we can address or relate to a nonpersonal 
being as Thou which is a term usually reserved for personal 
beings~ 
t: .""" 
\ . . .) 
Perhaps I can halp straighten out this problem in 
Buber's terminology -by stressing that the Thou refers not 
so much to what is addressed or relate1 to, but rather to 
how I address or relate. It is clear that for Buber what 
is addressed or related to in the I-Thou manner can be a 
personal or nonpersonal being. The terms I-Thou and I-It 
reflect a man's basic attitude toward being in one of its 
three spheres, The I of the I-Thou, or the ·person in 
Buber's technical sense, meets being essentially, 9 and can 
be characterized by an attitude of reverence that sees and 
appreciates the intrinsic importance of the world, other 
men and God. In short, a person recognizes the value of 
being in general and the value of each sphere of being. In 
contrast, the I of the overdeveloped I-It relation, or the 
ego in Buber's technical sense, can be characterized by an 
attitude of pride that can see everything only in light of 
itself. It is important to remem·ber that Buber sees the 
I-It as necessary but when the I-It becomes the dominant 
relation man is bordering on inauthenticity. Buber says, 
"Note well, not the I-It relationship itself, without which 
9cf. Buber, Tf.lit Eclipse of God, p. 129. 
r 
no earth ~y per ·sist ence of hunian existen ce is conceiv;:1.ble 
but its hybr is O\"'ers .rlding all. measu .r-e is meant. •=10 
A person recognizes and willin gl y ac~epts the claim 
that objective values make. An ego, because he is solely 
concerned with himself is either · blind to this claim or 
even worse, sees th e claim but openly rebels against it. 
In his Good an d Evil Buber distin guishes between what he 
calls two stages of evil. In the first stage one is blinded 
due to his self preoccupation and cannot see "what offers 
itself". In the second stage one is bent on destroying 
"what offers itself 11 • 11 Malcolm Diamond says: 
He (Buber) has called the first sta ge 
of evil the way of the sinners who aga in . 
and again mis s God ' s way throu gh their 
failure to direct themselves toward the 
good, The stage of radical ev il is that 
of the wicked who oppose God's way
1
w.ith 
the basic attitude of their being. ~ 
Paul Pfuetze comments that Buber "considers the radical 
stages of eYil (as) resulting from absolute self affirmation -
and man's presumptuous usurpation of the moral and creative 
I. 
iOBuber, "Replies . to My Critics," in The Philosophy of 
~.artin Buber, p. 716. 
11Buber, Good. and Evi_l, p. JO. 




role of God .. 13 'rhe two st -.',;_0 i ;;:; 6.f f~•.til represent two forms 
of i na uthentic existence a I :n both man fai.ls to achieve 
the axiological essence Buber undersoores throughou:t his 
thought. In both stages the I is the I of the ego. And 
as Buber says: 
How disGonant t he I of the ego soundst 
When it issues from tragic lips, tense 
with some self contradiction that they 
try to hold ba ck, it can move us to 
great pity. When it issues from chaotic 
lips tha t sava gely, heedlessly, uncon-
ciously represent contradiction it can 
make us shudder. When the lips are va in 
and smooth i! sounds embarrassing or 
disgusting. 
The heart of Buber's philosophy is his recognition of 
man's capacity to transcend himself, that is, man's ability 
to be concerned with beings other than himself and enter into 
appropriate relations with that which he encounters. Re-
covering his transcendence is what rescues man from the all 
encompassing ego that threatens authenticity and like a 
cancer dominates our age. Buber's thought tries to restore 
the prima .cy of man's capacity to transcend himself by making 
it the basic principle of virtuous living. Buber's recogni-
tion of man's transcendence is what makes his and Sartre's 
13Paul Pfuetze, "Martin Buber and American Pragma.tism," 
in The Philosophy of Martin Buber. p. 537. 
14 . Buber, I and ±Pou, p. 115. 
existentia l is m re mote. Shr -tr e :la s cl ose d his eyes · to 
the I-Thou re laticn and t Len wonder s v,hy ha cannot see 
the other except in · terms -of dominat ion and ·c-onflic ·tG 
Sartre's freedom becomes a declaration of war between an 
indhridual and the r e st of being. I<'or Buber 1 "It is a 
question of usi ng this freedom properly, that is, in a 
manner worthy of the fact t hat it is a freedom which is 
given to us. 1115 Buber stresses the fact that :man must 
recognize and freely accept the values intrinsic to being. 
The reverence that characterizes the person who lives the 
I-Thou relation is the basic attitude that makes the ethi-
cal and virtuous life possible, 
15Buber, The Eclip se of _9-od, p. 69. 
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